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NIAGARA COUNTY JUSTICE COURT
People v. Harvey'
(decided February 4, 2010)
Jon Harvey filed a pre-trial motion seeking to exclude the
People's hearsay evidence against him-records regarding the main-
tenance and calibration of the breath test machine and the analysis of
the breath test simulator solution 2  (hereinafter "Calibration
Records")-in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Me-
lendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts.3 The defendant claimed that the cali-
bration records were "testimonial" hearsay and that admitting them
without the ability to cross-examine the analysts who authored those
records violated the Confrontation Clause of both the Sixth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 6 of the
New York State Constitution.4 The Niagara County Justice Court
denied the defendant's motion, finding that the Supreme Court's
holding in Melendez-Diaz did not impact its decision.' The court
held that the calibration records were clearly non-testimonial hearsay,
admissible under the business records exception, and therefore did
not require the in-court testimony of the analysts who actually pre-
pared the documents.6
In driving while intoxicated ("DWI") cases, before the results
of a breathalyzer test may be introduced at trial, the prosecution must
establish foundational evidence pertaining to the calibration and
maintenance of the instrument used in performing the breathalyzer
' No. 09100144, 2010 WL 376935 (N.Y. Just. Ct. Feb. 4, 2010).
2 Id. at * 1.
129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
4 Harvey, 2010 WL 376935, at *1. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion states, in relevant part, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
. . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him." Article 1, section 6 of the New York
State Constitution 6 states, in relevant part, "In any trial in any court whatever the party ac-
cused shall ... be confronted with the witnesses against him or her."
Harvey, 2010 WL 376935, at *1.
6 Id. at *2-3.
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test. 7  The prosecution will commonly attempt to satisfy this re-
quirement by producing the calibration and maintenance records as-
sociated with the instrument that produced the breathalyzer test re-
sults and seek to admit them under New York's business and
government records exception to hearsay evidence.' Prior to Harvey,
the Niagara County Justice Court addressed a Confrontation Clause
challenge to the admissibility of these calibration records in People v.
Krueger.9 The defendant in Krueger argued that these records were
testimonial hearsay under Crawford v. Washington,'o and admitting
them without allowing her the opportunity to cross-examine the per-
sons who prepared them was a violation of her constitutional right to
confront her accuser." The court ruled that the records in question
did not fall under the definition of "testimonial" statements, as they
were "not affidavits and were made before the . . . arrest of the de-
fendant."' 2 The calibration records, the court maintained, were rou-
tinely kept business records that were not prepared specifically for
the prosecution of the defendant.13 Moreover, the state trooper that
performed the breathalyzer test appeared to testify and was available
for a thorough cross-examination regarding the procedure used to ob-
tain the defendant's blood-alcohol content.14 In light of these consid-
erations, the court found that the admission of the calibration records
did not violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confronta-
tion.'s
In Harvey, the defendant filed a motion in limine asking the
court to revisit its previous ruling in Krueger and find that the admis-
sion of the calibration records did indeed require that the defendant
have an opportunity to cross-examine the analysts who prepared
them.16 The defendant argued that the Supreme Court's recent deci-
7 People v. Freeland, 497 N.E.2d 673, 673 (N.Y. 1986).
8 Id.
9 804 N.Y.S.2d 908 (Niagara Cnty. Just. Ct. 2005).
'0 541 U.S. 36, 68-69 (2004) (holding that the Confrontation Clause requires a determina-
tion of whether the evidence sought to be admitted is testimonial or non-testimonial in cha-
racter).
11 Krueger, 804 N.Y.S.2d at 910.
12 Id. at 913 (emphasis in the original).
" Id. at 912-13.
14 Id. at 913.
'6 Id.
16 Harvey, 2010 WL 376935, at *1.
[Vol. 27848
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sion in Melendez-Diaz mandated that the prosecution produce the
analysts to testify to preserve the defendant's right to confront his ac-
cusers.' 7 The court denied the defendant's motion, maintaining that
the defendant misread Melendez-Diaz, and that the decision "reaf-
firm[ed] the Supreme Court's position regarding business records,"
and that such records " 'are generally admissible absent confrontation
not because they qualify under an exception,' " but because they were
created solely for the administration purposes of the business, and
thus were non-testimonial.'8
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment preserves
the right for all criminal defendants to confront their accusers.19 It
has been argued, however, that certain evidence that is admissible
pursuant to the hearsay exceptions under either federal or state rules
of evidence eliminates this right, and it follows that the admission of
said evidence may constitute a violation of the Sixth Amendment.20
The Supreme Court has acknowledged this tension between the hear-
say exceptions of the federal and states' respective rules of evidence
and a defendant's constitutional right to confront his accusers. 2 1 Ac-
cordingly, the Supreme Court has set forth criteria for evaluating al-
leged Confrontation Clause violations in order to ensure that the fra-
mers' intent to require confrontation has been met.22
The landmark case surrounding Confrontation Clause chal-
lenges to the admissibility of evidence under hearsay exceptions is
Crawford v. Washington.23 In Crawford, the defendant was charged
with assault and attempted murder.24 At trial, over the defendant's
objections, the prosecution was permitted to introduce evidence of a
recorded statement given by the defendant's wife to the police in or-
der to contradict the defendant's claim of self-defense. 2 5 The defen-
dant argued that admitting this statement violated his right to confront
17 Id
18 Id. at *2-3 (quoting Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2539) (alteration to the original).
19 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42.
20 See id. at 40; Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2531; Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813,
817-20 (2006); FED. R. EVID. 803-04; N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4518-20 (McKinney 2010).
21 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42.
22 See id. at 68.
23 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
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the witnesses against him.26 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority,
set forth in great detail the historical background surrounding the
Confrontation Clause in order to evaluate the framers' intent. 27  Al-
though the Supreme Court conceded that the case could be resolved
according to the rule set forth in Ohio v. Roberts,28 it departed from
the Roberts standard and determined that Confrontation Clause chal-
lenges surrounding evidence admitted pursuant to hearsay exceptions
should be decided by giving attention to the character of the evidence
sought to be admitted.2 9
The Court in Crawford held that, "[w]here testimonial evi-
dence is at issue . . . , the Sixth Amendment demands what the com-
mon law required," and, in order for such evidence to become ad-
missible, the declarant must be unavailable to testify and the
defendant must have had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant. 30 In so holding, the Court declined the opportunity to pro-
vide a comprehensive definition of what would constitute testimonial
evidence. 31 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court did identify three broad
categories of evidence that shall constitute the core group of that dis-
tinction.3 2 Ultimately, the Court in Crawford felt that the purpose of
the Confrontation Clause was to ensure the reliability of testimonial
evidence by allowing a criminal defendant to cross-examine the wit-
26 Id. The trial court's ruling that there was no constitutional violation was reversed on
appeal and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the lower courts' decisions. Id. at
41-42.
27 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43-50.
28 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (holding that the right to confrontation is not violated if the
statement is within a "firmly rooted hearsay exception" or carries an "adequate 'indicia of
reliability' "). The Court in Crawford determined that this rule for evaluating Confrontation
Clause challenges to hearsay exceptions failed to carry out the framer's intent and could like-
ly result in being both over and under-inclusive in allowing the admission of hearsay evi-
dence. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60.
29 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. The Supreme Court admits that "not all hearsay [evidence]
implicates the Sixth Amendment's core concerns," and evidence sought to be admitted under
a hearsay exception must be evaluated to determine whether it is testimonial or non-
testimonial in character. Id. at 51 (emphasis in the original) (alteration to the original).
30 Id. at 68 (emphasis added).
31 id.
32 See id at 51-52. The three categories enumerated by the Court were: (1) "ex parte in-
court testimony or its functional equivalent"; (2) "extrajudicial statements .... such as affi-
davits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions"; and (3) "statements that were made un-
der circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the
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nesses against him.33 Although the rules of evidence surrounding
hearsay exceptions purport to accomplish the same, the best way to
ensure reliability of the evidence was to allow the defendant to con-
front the source. 34  The Court noted that whatever additional evi-
dence this term may encompass, at a minimum, it shall apply "to
prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a
former trial; and to police interrogations." 35
The absence of a comprehensive definition of testimonial evi-
dence by the Supreme Court in Crawford created the distinct possi-
bility that the lower courts applying its holding would encounter un-
certainty when faced with challenges to admissible hearsay that
comprise the periphery of testimonial evidence. Indeed, the lack of a
definition has required the Court to periodically expand upon the
Crawford holding in order to provide some guidance to the lower
courts in evaluating the character of certain admissible hearsay evi-
dence.
For example, in Davis v. Washington,36 the Supreme Court
was called upon to further expand upon its holding in Crawford and
determine whether all statements made to law enforcement personnel
fell under the category of "police interrogation" and were thus subject
to the restrictions imposed by the Confrontation Clause. The Court
recognized that its previous decision did not fully "define what [the
Court] meant by [police] 'interrogations.' "38 This lack of clarity re-
quired the Supreme Court to provide for a more functional definition
of testimonial statements.39 In doing so, the Court focused on the
circumstances surrounding the statements at issue and the declarant's
3 Id. at 68-69. "[T]he Clause's ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a
procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It commands, not that evidence be reliable,
but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-
examination." id. at 61.
34 Id. at 68-69.
3 Id. at 68.
36 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
Id. at 823 (alteration to the original). The Court maintained that the facts pertaining to
the challenge presented before the Court in Crawford did not require a comprehensive defi-
nition. Id On the other hand, the issues before the Court in Davis were not as clear and re-
quired a more intensive analysis of the facts and circumstances surrounding the statements.
Id.
3 Davis, 547 U.S. at 823.
2011] 851
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primary purpose for giving them.40 While some of the statements
made during a call to a 911 operator were procured to meet an ongo-
ing emergency, the statements given to police responding to the do-
mestic disturbance report, on the other hand, were procured when
there was no such ongoing emergency. 4' This distinction controlled
whether the statements were characterized as testimonial or non-
testimonial.42 As a result, the Supreme Court held that if a statement
made to police personnel, when viewed objectively, indicates that it
was made to "enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergen-
cy," and not to establish past events, then the statement is non-
testimonial. 43 However, to the contrary, the statement is testimonial
when there is no emergency situation and the speaker is describing
past events that, viewed objectively, would indicate a "primary pur-
pose . . . to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later
criminal prosecution.""
Again, the Court confined its reasoning to statements made to
law enforcement personnel and did not attempt to clarify what would
constitute a testimonial statement when it was made to someone other
than law enforcement personnel, or clarify how Crawford would ap-
ply to other hearsay exceptions. Thus, following Davis, the full im-
pact of the Crawford decision on the admissibility of hearsay evi-
dence remained primed for further review.
Most recently, in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,45 the Su-
preme Court was faced with a Confrontation Clause challenge to a
40 Id at 826. At issue in Davis was whether statements made during a call to a 911 opera-
tor constituted testimonial evidence. Id. at 817. In its companion case, Hammon v. Indiana,
the evidence at issue concerned statements made to police responding to a domestic distur-
bance report. Id. at 819-20.
41 Id. at 827, 829.
42 Davis, 547 U.S. at 822. "[T]he initial interrogation conducted in connection with a 911
call, is ordinarily not designed primarily to 'establis[h] or prov[e]' some past fact, but to de-
scribe current circumstances requiring police assistance." Id. at 827. The Court distin-
guished these statements from the one elicited in Crawford, because in Davis the declarant
was not speaking about earlier events and "the nature of what was asked and answered," to
the objective viewer, were such that "the elicited statements were necessary to be able to re-
solve the present emergency," and not for the purposes of subsequent prosecution. Id. These
distinctions, however, were not present in the companion case, Hammon, where there was no
emergency and the purpose of the questioning was to establish past events to be used at a
later criminal proceeding. Id. at 829.
43 Id. at 822.
" Davis, 547 U.S. at 822.
45 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
852 [Vol. 27
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forensics report that indicated that the substance in the defendant's
possession was cocaine.46 The Court determined that the forensics
report, simply stated, was the equivalent of a sworn statement
" 'made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.' "47
Notably, the fact to be proven-that the substance the defendant pos-
sessed was cocaine-was a crucial fact essential to prove the defen-
dant's guilt and obtain a conviction.48 Therefore, the documents
sought to be introduced by the prosecution were "functionally iden-
tical to live, in-court testimony, doing 'precisely what a witness does
on direct examination.' "49 As a result, the Court found that "the ana-
lysts' affidavits were testimonial statements, and the analysts were
'witnesses' for purposes of the Sixth Amendment.""o It followed that
the forensics report was inadmissible unless the prosecution was able
to show, as per Crawford, "that the analysts were unavailable to testi-
fy at trial and that [the defendant] had a prior opportunity to cross-
examine them.",5  However, in so ruling, the Supreme Court noted
that not everyone "whose testimony may be relevant in establishing
the chain of custody, authenticity of the sample, or accuracy of the
testing device, must appear in person as part of the prosecution's
case," and that "documents prepared in the regular course of equip-
ment maintenance may well qualify as nontestimonial records."52
Following the decision in Melendez-Diaz, it was fairly certain
that the limits of the Supreme Court's latest interpretation of Con-
frontation Clause jurisprudence would be tested and subjected to in-
terpretation by the federal courts. For example, in United States v.
Bacas,53 a defendant charged with a speeding violation challenged
the admission of the certificates of accuracy that purported to estab-
lish the proper operation of the radar device that was used to deter-
46 Id. at 2530.
47 Id. at 2532 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51). The Court determined that the docu-
ments at issue, namely affidavits, fell within the "core class of testimonial statements" de-
scribed in Crawford. Id.
48 id
49 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 830).
50 Id.
5 Id The Court reasoned that "[c]onfrontation is one means of assuring accurate forensic
analysis," and "is designed to weed out not only the fraudulent analyst, but the incompetent
one as well." Id. at 2536-37.
52 Id. at 2532 n.1.
1 662 F. Supp. 2d 481 (E.D. Va. 2009).
8532011]
7
Wenz: Niagara County Justice Court: People v. Harvey
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2011
TOURO LAWREVIEW
mine the defendant's rate of speed.54 Although the officer who tested
the accuracy of the radar device testified at trial and was subject to
cross-examination, the individual who calibrated the device did not
appear at trial.ss Relying on Melendez-Diaz, the defendant chal-
lenged that the certificates were testimonial hearsay, and admitting
them without producing the preparer for cross-examination violated
his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser. 56 In finding no
constitutional violation, the court distinguished the records before it
from those in Melendez-Diaz, finding that the certificates offered on-
ly information of the proper calibration of the equipment and were
not specifically related to the defendant before the court.5 7 Moreo-
ver, the technicians performing the calibration were unaware that any
of their records would be involved in litigation.5 8  The court con-
cluded that the challenged certificates were non-testimonial in nature
"because they lack[ed] the primary purpose of proving past events
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution against [the] particu-
lar defendant," and thus, were admissible.59
The Supreme Court has not decided the precise issue pre-
sented in Harvey, and until then, the lower courts are responsible for
synthesizing Crawford and Melendez-Diaz and applying a similar
analysis when determining the outcome. For example, in United
States v. Griffin,60 a defendant charged with driving under the influ-
ence of alcohol ("DUI") filed a pretrial motion to exclude the calibra-
tion and maintenance records of the breathalyzer used to administer
his breath test.6' In evaluating the defendant's motion, the federal
district court recognized the Supreme Court's recent decision in Me-
lendez-Diaz, but found the documents presented before the court easi-
ly distinguishable. 62 It was quite apparent "that a Certificate of Ac-
curacy, introduced only to verify the calibration of a testing device
used by law enforcement, does not constitute testimony 'against' a
defendant in the same way as a certificate of analysis offered to es-
54 Id. at 483.
s Id. at 483-84.
16 Id. at 483.
"7 Id. at 485-86.
ss Bacas, 662 F. Supp. 2d at 485.
s9 Id. at 486.
60 No. 3:09MJ308, 2009 WL 3064757 (E.D. Va. Sept. 22, 2009).
61 Id. at *1.
62 Id. at *2.
854 [Vol. 27
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tablish an element of an offense."63 Unlike the records in Melendez-
Diaz, the Certificate of Accuracy "only conveys information regard-
ing the calibration and proper operation of the [breathalyzer]," and
that "[t]he " 'primary purpose' of calibration certificates . . . is not 'to
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal
prosecution.' "' Furthermore, the court emphasized that the arrest-
ing officer who performed the breath test would testify at trial and
was available for cross-examination by the defendant "to verify ...
that proper procedures were followed to ensure an accurate result." 65
The records sought to be admitted did nothing more than "certify that
routine calibration testing has been performed on [the device], with-
out regard to the certificate's use against any particular defendant, or
[its] introduction to prove any element of an offense."66 According-
ly, the federal district court found the calibration records for the brea-
thalyzer to be non-testimonial evidence that did not require confron-
tation.67
In addition to the protection provided by the Sixth Amend-
ment, the New York State Constitution contains an analogous clause
which also preserves a criminal defendant's right to confront his ac-
cuser. 68 However, New York's protection is not limited to criminal
proceedings but is also applicable to civil suits. 69 Not surprisingly,
following the decision in Melendez-Diaz, New York courts have al-
ready been called upon to interpret its implications.
Recently, New York's highest court, in People v. Brown,
addressed a Sixth Amendment challenge to forensic records sought to
be admitted by the prosecution under the business records exception
to New York's rules of evidence. 7 ' At issue was "a DNA report con-
taining machine-generated raw data, graphs and charts of the .. . [de-
63 id
6 Id. (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822).
65 Griffin, 2009 WL 3064757, at *2.
6 Id. at *3 (alteration to the original).
67 Id.
68 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2531 (citing Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965)).
Article I, section 6 of the New York Constitution states in, pertinent part, "In any trial in any
court whatever the party accused shall ... be confronted with the witnesses against him or
her."
69 See N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
70 918 N.E.2d 927 (N.Y. 2009).
71 Id. at 928.
2011] 855
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fendant's] DNA characteristics."72 The defendant objected to the in-
troduction of this report, arguing that the report was "testimonial evi-
dence" which did not allow the defendant the opportunity to cross-
examine the preparer, and therefore was a violation of the Confronta-
tion Clause of the Sixth Amendment.7 3 The New York Court of Ap-
peals distinguished Brown from the Supreme Court's Melendez-Diaz
holding, finding "[t]here were no conclusions, interpretations or
comparisons apparent in the report."74 It followed that the only tes-
timony the technicians would be able to provide was "how they per-
formed certain procedures," and that it was clear from the holding in
Melendez-Diaz that "not everyone 'whose testimony may be relevant
... must appear in person as part of the prosecution's case.' "
In July 2010, a New York appellate court addressed the pre-
cise challenge presented in Harvey. In People v. Lent,76 the defen-
dant appealed his conviction for driving while intoxicated asserting,
among other things, that the admission at trial of "certified copies of
the simulator solution certification and the calibration/maintenance
documentation in relation to the breath test instrument," without pro-
ducing the analysts for cross-examination, violated the defendant's
right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment.7 7 The court con-
ceded that the "personnel responsible for calibrating and maintaining
breath test machines are not 'independent of law enforcement,' " and
the business records exception would not preclude scrutiny to eva-
luate whether the reports rise to the level of "testimonial evidence"
that would eliminate the hearsay exception and require confronta-
tion.78 However, although "the purpose of accurate breath-alcohol
measuring machines is to produce evidence that may be used at trial,
the calibration and maintenance documents in relation to the ma-
chines are not testimonial."79  The court reasoned that the records
were not a product of police interrogation-they were not created to
gather incriminating evidence against a particular individual, "they
[did] not involve opinions or conclusions relevant to a particular in-
72 Id. at 929 (alteration to the original).
74 Id. at 931.
7 Brown, 918 N.E.2d at 931-32 (quoting Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532 n.1).
76 908 N.Y.S.2d 804 (App. Term 2d Dep't 2010).
n Id. at 807.
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vestigation," and the records themselves were not "a direct accusation
of an essential element of any offense."so Therefore, it followed that
the calibration and maintenance records were non-testimonial evi-
dence and may be admissible under the business records hearsay ex-
ception without violating the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment.
Although the majority of New York courts faced with this
particular challenge have also found such records to be non-
testimonial, 82 the issue has been decided to the contrary and the cali-
bration records have been precluded based on a finding that the
records were indeed testimonial. 83 For example, in People v. Carrei-
ra,84 a lower New York court recently held that these records are tes-
timonial in nature and subject to Confrontation Clause limitations.85
In Carreira, the court had a fundamentally different interpretation of
the Supreme Court's rulings in Crawford and Melendez-Diaz, and
sustained the defendant's pretrial motion to exclude the calibration
and maintenance records of the breath test instrument. The court
maintained that because the "entire purpose [of the records] is to help
provide reliable evidence for prosecuting DWI suspects," and they
were created for the specific purpose of litigation, it rendered them,
as per Melendez-Diaz, unable to avoid confrontation." In so holding,
the Watertown City Court rejected the reasoning of courts that found
the records to be non-testimonial because it felt those courts "ignored
Crawford's 'prepared for litigation' language, which clearly impi-
cate[d] the documents in question," and that their rationale failed to
recognize that these types of records were not "typical business
records."88 The court showed a marked concern over the reliability
of these records due to recent reported improprieties within the state
police lab as well as concerns about the simulator solution, which
80 Id. at 808-09.
8 Lent, 908 N.Y.S.2d at 808-09.
82 See People v. Kelly, No. 2007NY078228, 2009 WL5183779, at *4 (N.Y. Cnty. Crim.
Ct. Dec. 22, 2009); People v. Kanhai, 797 N.Y.S.2d 870, 875 (Queens Cnty. Crim. Ct.
2005).
83 See People v. Heyanka, 886 N.Y.S.2d 801, 801-02 (Suffolk Cnty. Dist. Ct. 2009).
84893 N.Y.S.2d 844 (Watertown City Ct. 2010).
8 Id. at 846.
86 Id. at 847.
87 Id. at 848-49 (alteration to the original).
88 Id. at 847.
2011] 857
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presumably influenced its decision.8 9 Ultimately, the court in Car-
reira determined that the admission of the calibration records under
the business records exception posed too much of a risk of unreliabil-
ity to be exempt from the mandates of the Confrontation Clause of
the Sixth Amendment.90
After evaluating the federal and New York State judicial his-
tory surrounding Confrontation Clause challenges to a breath test in-
strument's calibration and maintenance records, it is hard not to no-
tice that the majority of the courts have held that the records are non-
testimonial in nature. However, equally important is the fact that the
Supreme Court has not ruled precisely on this issue. Thus, a court
may be persuaded by the overall judicial majority, but not necessarily
bound by the decisions. Clearly, the absence of a complete determi-
nation by the Supreme Court allows for a divide among the various
jurisdictions, and it is reasonable to conclude that the Court will need
to address this issue sometime in the future in order to provide some
stability in the law.
However, until the Supreme Court decides the issue presented
here, the onus is on the lower courts to make sense of the Court's rea-
soning in Crawford, Davis, and Melendez-Diaz. The Niagara County
Justice Court in Harvey gave due deference to these decisions in its
opinion. 91 While the court was critical of the defendant's interpreta-
tion of Melendez-Diaz,92 the written opinion by the court also seems
to stray from the reasoning of the Supreme Court in determining the
outcome. Although the end result could remain the same, the court in
Harvey gave too much credit to the fact that the calibration records
fell under New York's business records exception to hearsay. Inter-
preting Melendez-Diaz to suggest that the Supreme Court has reaf-
firmed the admissibility of all business records clearly undermines
the substance of the Court's reasoning. An important aspect of the
Court's decision was that not all evidence admissible under the busi-
ness records exception is consistent with the right provided by the
Confrontation Clause. Even though the Supreme Court suggested
that most hearsay under the business records exception would be
89 Carreira, 893 N.Y.S.2d at 850-51.
90 Id. at 851.
9 See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
92 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
858 [Vol. 27
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found to be admissible without requiring cross-examination, 93 Courts
are still required to examine such evidence for its intended purpose
and effect to determine if they are indeed non-testimonial.
The court's opinion in Harvey does not get into such an in-
quiry and instead relies on its prior ruling and the majority of deci-
sions set forth by the other courts in New York. 94 Finding the cali-
bration records to be non-testimonial is not troubling, but the court's
reasoning would be much more persuasive had it explicitly distin-
guished its case from the issue presented in Melendez-Diaz. Instead,
the court said the records in question were non-testimonial because
the Supreme Court said that most business records would be found to
be non-testimonial.9 5 While that may be true, the Court still has pro-
vided the lower courts with a sufficient framework that requires the
courts to make an inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the
preparation of such records.
It is worth noting, however, that the Niagara County Justice
Court's ruling in Krueger, decided pre-Melendez-Diaz, was based
upon the appropriate inquiry and the records were evaluated in a
manner that was consistent with the Supreme Court's Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence.96  The court addressed the relevant circums-
tances surrounding the preparation of the breath test calibration
records and determined that they were not prepared with the specific
intent to prosecute any particular defendant, including the defendant
before the court.9 7 Indeed, it was this determination that supported
the court's ruling that the calibration records were non-testimonial
hearsay admissible under Crawford. Similarly, the majority of New
York courts, including the New York appellate court in Lent, have al-
so found the records admissible without violating the defendant's
right to confrontation, each emphasizing that the neutrality of the
records towards the prosecution of any particular case renders the
evidence non-testimonial.9' The decision in Melendez-Diaz does not
undermine this approach, but instead enforces it.
However, the lack of binding precedent allows for conflicting
9 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
94 See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
95 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
96 See supra notes 9-15 and accompanying text.
9 Id.
98 See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
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views among the courts, as illustrated in Carreira.99 While the Wa-
tertown City Court seemingly performed a similar inquiry into the
circumstances, the court's analysis resulted in a determination that
the calibration records were testimonial and subject to the restrictions
of the Confrontation Clause.'00 Clearly, its departure from the major-
ity of New York courts was merely a matter of perspective on the
purpose and effect of the records in question. In ruling that the Con-
frontation Clause required the analysts to testify in court, the court in
Carreira asserted that the calibration procedures were indeed per-
formed solely for the purposes of litigation.'o' While the records
may not be designed to prosecute a particular defendant, the breath
test instrument's calibration records are necessary for the prosecution
of all defendants where breath tests are performed.102 In other words,
inherent in any given calibration is the future prosecution of a defen-
dant. Furthermore, the court's concern with the potential for unrelia-
ble records from either crime lab improprieties or other issues should
not be dismissed summarily. 03 Where liberty interests are at stake,
the reliability of evidence utilized to establish guilt is paramount.
Even though this is clearly the minority view, the court's reasoning
does not necessarily seem to be inconsistent with either Crawford or
Melendez-Diaz.
The existence of these conflicting viewpoints suggests that
this issue is ripe for review by the Supreme Court and the New York
Court of Appeals. Clearly, it should be no surprise that the use of
breath test results has been more prevalent with the seemingly infinite
amount of DWI arrests that take place each day, especially in New
York. It is likely that the void in the law, with regard to the admissi-
bility of the calibration records, will continue to subject the courts to
regular challenges in order to test a particular court's perspective on
the issue.
Undoubtedly, the court in Harvey and other courts facing
these challenges would have preferred to have the issues surrounding
the admission of breath test calibration records pre-determined by the
Supreme Court, so that they would have limited discretion in evaluat-
9 See supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
100 Id
1o' See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
102 id.
103 See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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ing the challenge. However, that has not been the case with many
Confrontation Clause challenges to admissible hearsay evidence in
the aftermath of Crawford. Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court has
been reluctant to draw all encompassing, bright line rules in this area,
and has generally confined all of its decisions to the facts at hand.
Indeed, the seemingly infinite sources of hearsay evidence that may
possibly be admitted into court makes the thought of bright line rules
impossible to create. Nonetheless, establishing binding precedent to
finally determine this particular issue would be in no way trivial.
In the meantime, the courts will continue to have to address
these issues according to the criteria already provided. Just because
the court in Carreira currently is in the minority on this issue, does
not necessarily make it any more probable that it is wrong in its anal-
ysis and the majority of New York courts are correct in theirs. The
conflict between the hearsay exceptions and the emerging case law
surrounding the Confrontation Clause necessarily creates the divide
among the courts and time will dictate whether this issue will be set-
tled by the court that binds all.
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